Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?
Robert V. Percival1
Although the precautionary principle is a relatively recent concept in the history
of environmental law, it has been widely embraced throughout the world. As articulated
in the Rio Declaration, signed in 1992 by representatives of 178 nations, the principle
states that a lack of scientific certainty should not preclude states from adopting costeffective measures to control environmental risks.2 The European Union has expressly
endorsed the precautionary principle as part of its regulatory directives and some argue
that the principle is so widely accepted that it should be recognized as customary
international law.
Despite its growing popularity, the precautionary principle has come under fire in
recent years. Its critics generally have been drawn from the ranks of those who are well
known critics of environmental regulation. They argue that the precautionary principle is
incoherent, potentially paralyzing, and that it will lead regulators to make bad choices.
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Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in their argument is the notion that society faces greater
peril from overly costly regulations adopted at the behest of a fearful public than from
exposure to sources of environmental risks whose effect on human health and the
environment is not fully understood at present.
This paper argues that, for the most part, critics of the precautionary principle are
attacking a straw man. It maintains that they are confusing the precautionary principle
with the separate question of how precautionary regulatory policy should be, both in the
breadth of regulatory targets and the stringency with which they are regulated. While
precaution long has been an important element of much of U.S. environmental law, in
practice, U.S. regulatory policy generally has been reactive, rather than truly
precautionary. Only in rare circumstances -- the most prominent example being the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer – have activities that
generate environmental risks been subjected to strict regulatory action when the risks
they generate were entirely theoretical. Although such truly precautionary regulation is
rare, the essential notion embodied in the precautionary principle -- that uncertainty
should not be used as an excuse to eschew cost-effective preventive measures -- is
fundamental to modern environmental law’s quest to transcend the limits of its common
law legacy. It does not require that innovation come to a halt whenever any risks may be
conjured. Properly understood, the precautionary principle is neither incoherent,
paralyzing, nor a prescription for overregulation. Rather it cautions that regulatory policy
should be pro-active in ferreting out potentially serious threats to human health and the
environment, as confirmed by the history of human exposure to substances such as lead
and asbestos.
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The paper begins by examining the history of the precautionary principle and the
criticisms levied against it by its critics. It then examines the role that precaution has
played in the history of U.S. environmental law, focusing on the history of human
exposure to lead and asbestos. The paper then concludes by assessing the precautionary
principle in light of this experience. It concludes that even though the precautionary
principle is not in itself a decision rule, it still should be considered an important element
of modern environmental law.
I.

HISTORY OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Some have argued that the precautionary principle is thousands of years old

because millennial oral traditions of indigenous people contain the concept of
precaution.3 Others trace it to a doctor’s recommendation in 1854 to remove the handle
of a water pump to stop a cholera epidemic4 or to the 1874 amendment of the British
Alkali Act that imposed technology-based limits on emissions of noxious gases by certain
factories.5
Although many examples exist of precautionary measures being undertaken prior
to the twentieth century,6 what has come to be known as the precautionary principle
emerged only late in that century. The roots of the precautionary principle usually are
traced to the concept of vosorgeprinzip developed in Germany during consideration of
3
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legislation in the 1970s to prevent air pollution from damaging forests.7 One translation
of vosorgeprinzip into English is “principle of foresight planning,” though that does not
adequately capture its true meaning.8 Vorsorge is “a word that combines notions of
foresight and taking care with those of good husbandry and best practice.”9 It does not
demand elimination of risk regardless of its likelihood or the costs entailed in doing so.10
Rather, vosorge emphasizes the importance of developing mechanisms for detecting risks
to human health and the environment so that measures can be taken to prevent harm. In
1984 the German Federal Interior Ministry explained the meaning of vosorge in the
following terms:
The principle of precaution commands that the damages done to the natural world
(which surrounds us all) should be avoided in advance and in accordance with
opportunity and possibility. Vorsorge further means the early detection of
dangers to health and environment by comprehensive, synchronized (harmonized)
research, in particular about cause and effect relationships. . . . [I]t also means
acting when conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not yet
available. Precaution means to develop, in all sectors of the economy,
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technological processes that significantly reduce environmental burdens,
especially those brought about by the introduction of harmful substances.11
The notion that environmental harm should be foreseen before it occurs was not
new. Nor was the realization that scientific uncertainty should not be an obstacle to
taking sensible preventive measures. These concepts were reflected in many of the early
environmental statutes adopted in various countries during the late 1960s and 1970s
including the Swedish Environmental Protection Act of 1969. But during the 1980s these
concepts came to be articulated more specifically as the precautionary principle, or
precautionary approach,12 which first was endorsed in a series of international agreements
to protect the North Sea.13
The most significant international endorsement of the precautionary principle
occurred at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The Rio Declaration, signed by the
178 nations participating in the conference, including the United States, stated in
Principle 15:
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“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.”14
While the English translation of Principle 15 refers to “the precautionary approach,” the
official translation in several other languages refers to “the precautionary principle.”15
The Rio Declaration’s statement of the precautionary principle has been widely
embraced in subsequent international agreements. Virtually identical language was
incorporated into the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change16 and in the
Preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity,17 which were adopted at the Rio
Earth Summit. The Mastricht Treaty of 1992 adopted the precautionary principle without
explaining what it provides, as did the 1997 Treaty establishing the European Community
(“EC Treaty”), which declared that EC environmental policy “shall be based on the
14
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precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter
should pay.”18 As discussed below, in February 2000 the European Commission issued a
Communication on the precautionary principle to explain in considerable detail its views
concerning what the principle is and how it should be applied in EC environmental policy
decisions.19
The United States government has been reluctant to embrace the precautionary
principle, even though it generally is consistent with the thrust of most U.S.
environmental laws, as discussed in Part III below. Disagreements over application of
the principle have arisen in the context of trade disputes between the U.S. and the EU
with the U.S. arguing that it should not be applied to justify banning the importation of
genetically modified food products. In May 2003, the U.S., with the support of Canada,
filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO), charging that the
moratorium applied by the European Commission (EC) since October 1998 on the
approval of biotech products has restricted imports of agricultural and food products from
the US and Canada. The U.S. and Canada argued that it was unlawful discrimination for
a number of EC member States to maintain national marketing and import bans on
biotech products even though those products have already been approved for import and
marketing in the EC.20
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II. CRITICISMS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
As the precautionary principle has grown in popularity, it has come under fire
from critics who believe that it could exacerbate what they perceive as a trend toward
overregulation. Frank Cross argued that “the precautionary principle is deeply perverse
in its implications for the environment and human welfare.”21 Complaining that the
growing popularity of the precautionary principle threatened risk analysis, Gail Charnley
complained that the principle was anti-science and its proponents were waging “the
newest skirmish in the age-old battle between science and ideology.”22 Aaron Wildavsky
complained that the precautionary principle is “a marvelous piece of rhetoric”23 and
Bjørn Lomborg maintained that if it is used to strengthen environmental protections, “the
precautionary principle is actually all about making worse decisions than we need to.”24
More recently, Robert Hahn and Cass Sunstein argue that “taken seriously, the
precautionary principle can be paralyzing, providing no direction at all,”25 in contrast to
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cost-benefit analysis, which they favor as a decision rule. Sunstein devotes much of his
book “The Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle” to attacking the principle
as indefensible, though he ultimately concludes that it can be useful in some
circumstances.26
While arguing that the precautionary principle is dangerous, its critics also charge
that it is so vague as to be incoherent. John Graham notes that the U.S. government
considers the notion of “any universal precautionary principle . . . to be a mythical
concept, perhaps like a unicorn.”27 In a recent lecture Cass Sunstein declares that “the
precautionary principle is incoherent.”28
Although there is no single, universally-accepted formulation of the precautionary
principle, the most widely-embraced statement of it is that contained in the Rio
Declaration, which was endorsed by nearly every country in the world. Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration states that “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”29 Notice that this statement
does not specify how precautionary regulatory policy should be. Rather it states only that
if there are threats of significant harm, scientific uncertainty should not serve as an
26
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obstacle to taking cost-effective preventive measures. It does not specify how significant
the harm must be, nor what particular cost-effective preventive measures should be
undertaken. Thus, it should not be viewed as an effort to establish any particular,
prescriptive decision rule.
Critics of the precautionary principle concede that the formulation articulated in
the Rio Declaration is unobjectionable.30 Referring to this as a “weak version” of the
precautionary principle, Sunstein describes it as “important” and “necessary in practice
only to combat public confusion or the self-interested claims of private groups
demanding unambiguous evidence of harm, which no rational society requires.”31
Rather than focusing their fire on the Rio Declaration, critics of the precautionary
principle focus on what they describe as a “strong version” of it that would require
stringent regulation of anything that cannot be shown not to pose a possible risk to health,
safety, or the environment.32 For example, Frank Cross argues:
Applied fully and logically, the precautionary principle could cannibalize itself
and potentially obliterate all environmental regulation. Environmentalists would
apply the principle to chemicals and industries, but why not apply it to the
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environmental regulations themselves? According to the burden of proof
approach, advocates or regulation would be required to demonstrate to a certainty
the absence of counterproductive effects on health resulting from the effects of the
regulation itself. The practical consequences of regulation are so uncertain that
advocates typically could not meet this burden, and the precautionary principle
would preclude further regulation.33
Such an extreme version of the precautionary principle seems far-fetched, but its
critics at times seem intent on creating a caricature of it in an effort to defuse its growing
popularity.34 Their primary objection is founded on the notion that precautionary
regulation may create risks of its own either by depriving society of “opportunity
benefits” that could prevent even greater harm than prevented by the regulation or by
inducing substitution of products or activities that pose even greater risks than those
caused by the subject of regulation.35 This objection is similar to the now-familiar “riskrisk” tradeoff argument made by critics of environmental regulation.36 In the context of
regulating well-known risks, the argument is highly problematic when it urges that such
risks not be regulated because of the possibility that other less well-understood risks may
33
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take their place and be even more significant. Since history teaches that the most
common way society becomes aware of risk is from the actual manifestation of harm,37 it
is dubious to assume that substitute activities or products necessarily will be more risky.
Given the substantial barriers agencies face when engaging in risk regulation, theoretical
risks that are taken seriously enough to generate precautionary regulation are unlikely to
be systematically less harmful than unknown and unregulated risks.
Moreover, risk-tradeoff analysis has been shown to be biased against
environmental regulation because it focuses only on ancillary risks generated by
regulation and not on regulation’s ancillary benefits.38 Rascoff and Revesz note that
many environmental regulations produce substantial ancillary benefits:
For example, a more stringent standard for carbon monoxide emissions in
automobile exhaust not only achieved its target of reducing air pollution, but also
had the ancillary benefit of significantly reducing loss of life attributable to
carbon monoxide-related accidents and suicides. Policies targeting greenhouse
gas reductions can be expected to have the ancillary benefit of reducing
conventional air pollutants. Policies favoring wastewater management through
constructed wetlands have ancillary benefits for public use and preservation of
habitats. Medical interventions--most notably drug therapies--have been
observed to have significant ancillary benefits.39
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It is curious that some critics of the precautionary principle cite the difficulty of
remediating existing environmental contamination as a reason for eschewing the
precautionary principle. For example, Frank Cross cites as examples of risk-risk
tradeoffs the fact that efforts to remediate asbestos and lead contamination occasionally
make things worse by inadvertently releasing more of these toxic substances into the
environment.40 One would think that the great difficulty of remediating these
contaminants actually would present a even stronger justification for enhanced
precautionary measures to prevent their initial placement into the environment.
Drawing from the growing literature on the psychology of risk perception, Cass
Sunstein maintains that there is reason to believe that the public will be overly fearful of
certain immediate risks that are statistically far less dangerous than what would substitute
for them if regulators responded to public demands for precaution.41 David Dana has
presented a strong counter-argument that the precautionary principle is justified as a
mechanism to counteract the same cognitive biases on which Sunstein relies.42 Dana
maintains that the public will be more inclined to avoid the immediate costs of
compliance with precautionary regulations whose uncertain benefits will accrue only in
the future. Sunstein concedes that this criticism “is not implausible” and “undoubtedly
leads to some good results.”43 But he maintains that the same myopia that supports
Dana’s argument also would apply to the public’s perceptions of the countervailing risks
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that would be incurred by the taking of precautionary action.44 Thus, Sunstein’s
argument appears to rest largely on the notion that precautionary action is more likely to
be counter-productive than beneficial because the public is incapable of knowing what
statistically is in its best interests. He concludes that only cost-benefit analysis offers a
way out of this self-constructed conundrum, without analyzing how efforts to quantify
the costs and benefits of regulation may distort decisionmakers’ perceptions of the levels
of uncertainty associated with them. Yet he ultimately concedes that for risks to which
there are no satisfactory bases for balancing costs and benefits, such as catastrophic risks
or the risks of species extinction, something akin to the precautionary principle makes
good sense.
Recently, Gary Marchant and Kenneth Mossman have sharply criticized the
precautionary principle by characterizing it as a vehicle for justifying arbitrary and
discriminatory trade measures imposed by members of the European Union (EU). Based
on an analysis of decisions by EU courts, Marchant and Mossman argue that the
precautionary principle has been applied in an arbitrary and inconsistent manner. They
conclude that this “confirms the fears of many skeptics of the precautionary principle that
it provides an open invitation for arbitrary and unreasonable decisions by both regulators
and judges.”45 Ironically, this criticism of the precautionary principle -- that it can be
manipulated to promote arbitrary decisionmaking – echoes a major criticism of costbenefit analysis that garnered substantial support because of the assymetrical way in
which it was employed by the Reagan Administration in a misguided effort to relax
44
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regulatory constraints on industry.46
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis who argue that acceptance of the
precautionary principle is likely to lead to bad choices by regulatory authorities
essentially are asserting that regulatory policy will be overly precautionary, generating
social costs that exceed the benefits of regulation. Yet, as noted above, the precautionary
principle does not purport to tell us how precautionary to be. Per Sandin has identified
the four major elements of the precautionary principle: (1) the threat dimension, (2) the
uncertainty dimension, (3) the action dimension, and (4) the command dimension.47 The
“threat dimension” refers to the potential dangers of the activity, product or substance
that would trigger precautionary action. The “uncertainty dimension” refers to the limits
of knowledge concerning whether the regulatory target poses the hazard. The “action
dimension” concerns how regulatory authorities will respond to the threat, while the
“command dimension” refers to their degree of discretion in doing so. Sandin describes
the four questions that must be answered to make the principle operative:
(1) To what types of hazards does the principle apply?
(2) Which level of evidence (lower than that of full scientific certainty) should be
required?
(3) What types of measures against potential hazards does the principle refer to?
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(4) With what force are these measures recommended (mandatory, merely
permitted, etc.)?48
Applying these concepts to the Rio Declaration’s statement of the precautionary
principle (“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.”), (1) the principle would apply to hazards “of
serious or irreversible damage,” (2) where there is something short of full scientific
certainty, (3) the actions that could be taken are cost-effective prevention measures, and
(4) the command is not to use lack of scientific certainty as a reason to postpone taking
such action.
In a very limited sense, this statement of the precautionary principle may tell us
something concerning how precautionary to be by at least establishing that certain
hazards should not be ignored entirely. As Sandin notes the statement actually is directed
only at deeming a particular argument (“lack of full scientific certainty”) unacceptable as
a reason for postponing undefined cost-effective actions to prevent the harm.49 One
should not postpone taking cost-effective measures to prevent serious or irreversible
damage, though it is not clear how great the threat must appear to be in order to trigger
application of the principle.
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It certainly is appropriate for the precautionary principle not to attempt to dictate
how precautionary regulatory policy should be. Decisions concerning how much
protection to afford to public health and the environment are so fundamental to the
relationship between governments and their citizenry that they must be informed by the
products of democratic political processes. The environmental laws that these countries
adopt are the authoritative declarations of how precautionary regulatory policy should be.
As debate continues over how precautionary regulatory policy should be, efforts are
being made to develop more refined methods for incorporating the precautionary
principle in decisionmaking processes in many of these countries.50
For example, the Commission of the European Communities has issued a
Communication outlining a detailed approach to using the precautionary principle and
establishing guidelines for applying it. As John Applegate notes, this Communication
seeks “to fit the precautionary principle into the risk paradigm” rather than serving as an
alternative to it.51 The Communication undermines the notion that European regulators
have adopted an “absolutist” version of the precautionary principle that requires stringent
regulation of anything alleged to pose a threat. The communication states in relevant part
that:
4. Recourse to the precautionary principle presupposes that potentially dangerous
effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have been identified, and
that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient
certainty. The implementation of an approach based on the precautionary principle
should
start with a scientific evaluation, as complete as possible, and where possible,
identifying at each stage the degree of scientific uncertainty.
50
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5. Decision-makers need to be aware of the degree of uncertainty attached to the
results of the evaluation of the available scientific information. Judging what is an
"acceptable" level of risk for society is an eminently political responsibility.
Decision-makers faced with an unacceptable risk, scientific uncertainty and
public concerns have a duty to find answers. Therefore, all these factors have to
be taken into consideration.
In some cases, the right answer may be not to act or at least not to introduce a
binding legal measure. A wide range of initiatives is available in the case of
action, going from a legally binding measure to a research project or a
recommendation.
The decision-making procedure should be transparent and should involve as early
as possible and to the extent reasonably possible all interested parties.
6. Where action is deemed necessary, measures based on the precautionary
principle
should be, inter alia:
• proportional to the chosen level of protection,
• non-discriminatory in their application,
• consistent with similar measures already taken,
• based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs of action or lack
of action (including, where appropriate and feasible, an economic cost/benefit
analysis),
• subject to review, in the light of new scientific data, and
• capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientific evidence
necessary for a more comprehensive risk assessment.52
The Communication emphasizes flexibility in responding to suspected risks. It
permits both risk assessment and examination of costs and benefits, while recognizing the
importance of reviewing interim regulatory measures in light of new scientific evidence.
While it does not rule out banning products if that is the only possible way to control a
risk, it endorses measures to require prior approval of potentially dangerous products and
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in certain cases shifting the burden of proof to the producer, manufacturer or importer.53
A comparison of risk regulation in Europe and the United States concluded that the
EU is not systematically more precautionary in its regulatory policy than is the U.S.54
The United States has been more precautionary than the EU in responding to certain
risks, including mad cow disease in blood, diesel engine exhaust, particulate air pollution,
environmental tobacco smoke and terrorism. Although this has been deemed a surprise
because the precautionary principle has been much more influential in Europe than in the
U.S., it should not be that surprising in light of the fact that the principle does not dictate
how precautionary regulatory policy should be. Yet most critics of the precautionary
policy base their objections to it on the notion that it will inexorably produce bad policy
choices weighted too heavily in the direction of preventing environmental harm. It also
should not be surprising when one considers that even without expressly embracing the
precautionary principle, U.S. environmental law has developed in a manner quite
consistent with many elements of it, as discussed in the section that follows.
III. THE ROLE OF PRECAUTION IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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Review of the history of U.S. environmental law can shed light on why Congress
took a decidedly precautionary turn when it adopted comprehensive regulatory legislation
to protect human health from environmental risks during the 1970s. Even before the
precautionary principle took center stage in the 1990s, some of its harshest critics already
were arguing that U.S. environmental policy had become unduly precautionary in
response to public overreaction to environmental risks.55 Yet despite the regulatory
statutes’ commitment to preventative regulation, chemicals still rarely are regulated until
after they have been released into the environment and damage to public health has
become apparent.56 This “dilemma of preventative regulation” reflects the facts that it
always is easier for scientists to identify hazards and to predict harm after it occurs and
that regulation is most politically salient when it responds to hazards that have become
highly visible to the public. As a result, rather than realizing its promise of preventative
regulation, environmental policy often is saddled with the far more difficult task of
remediating environmental contamination after it has occurred.
Critics of the precautionary principle fear that regulatory policy will make bad
choices if it responds to what they view as excessive public fear of certain risks. Yet the
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factors that influence how regulatory policy responds to environmental risks are not well
understood. In particular, few retrospective studies have explored why society has in
many instances failed to prevent pervasive environmental contamination from substances,
such as lead and asbestos, that long were known to be extremely hazardous.

Even

as scientific knowledge concerning the hazards of lead accumulated over time, the legal
system failed to avert widespread lead poisoning. The regulatory history of lead stands in
sharp contrast with the response to the stratospheric ozone depletion problem, a rare
instance in which truly precautionary regulation was undertaken solely in response to a
seemingly compelling scientific theory before actual harm to public health had been
detected.
A. Lead Poisoning in Early America
Lead can serve some very useful functions, but, like asbestos and
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), it ultimately has proven to be extremely hazardous to
human health and the environment. While its chemical properties make it easy to use in a
variety of products, lead performs no useful function in the human body. Exposures from
anthropogenic sources have caused lead to be present in the bodies of all humans as a
result of the use of lead in products, paint, plumbing, emissions from gasoline
combustion and smelters, and lead in waste streams. Levels of lead found in core
samples in Greenland's icecap suggest that by the year 1750 lead smelting activity had
increased atmospheric deposition of lead to a level (0.0100 mg/kg) twenty times greater
than the background level present in 800 B.C. (0.0005 mg/kg). The Industrial
Revolution and a massive increase in combustion of leaded gasoline have increased lead
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levels in icecap strata today to a level (0.2100 mg/kg) more than 400 times natural
background levels.57
As one of the most thoroughly studied toxic substances, lead has been found to
cause a broad array of adverse health effects in humans. Exposure to high levels of lead
can cause death. At lower levels of exposure, lead can cause anemia, kidney damage,
neurological injury, reproductive and developmental dysfunction. Lead also interferes
with blood biochemistry and is associated with high blood pressure.58 At some level of
exposure to lead "virtually all body systems will be injured or have a high risk of
injury."59 But lead also is particularly dangerous because of the apparently irreversible
neurologic and reproductive damage that it can cause even at relatively low levels of
exposure that still are not uncommon today. Because many of the health effects caused
by exposure to lead do not have easily identifiable symptoms, lead poisoning is often
difficult to diagnose, particularly for physicians who have little knowledge or experience
with the disease.
The use of high concentrations of lead in pewter is believed to have been
responsible for considerable lead poisoning in colonial America. Perhaps the most
remarkable early legislative response to lead poisoning occurred in the Massachusetts
Bay Colony in 1723. The colonial legislators enacted a law prohibiting the distillation of
57
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rum through leaden still heads or leaded pipes following complaints that colonists in
North Carolina had become ill from drinking rum distilled in New England.60

While the

legislation probably reflects greater concern for preserving profitable trade than for
protecting public health, it indicates that colonial authorities understood some of the
potential hazards of lead.
Benjamin Franklin was the most important public figure to publicize the dangers
of exposure to lead in colonial America. While working in England as a printer's
apprentice in 1724, Franklin observed the maladies suffered by workers exposed to the
heating of lead type during the cleaning process. In 1745 he published Thomas
Cadwalader's "Dry Gripes," an essay arguing that epidemics of "dry gripe," which most
people associated with the drinking of rum, actually were caused by the use of lead
materials in distillation equipment.61 While in Paris in 1767, Franklin visited a hospital
that had become famous for treating "what he called Dry Bellyach, or Colica Pictonum."
After obtaining a list of the occupations of the patients, Franklin noted that:
all the Patients were of Trades, that, some way or other, use or work in Lead, such
as Plumbers, Glaziers, Painters &c., excepting only two kinds, Stonecutters and
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Soldiers. These I could not reconcile to my Notion, that Lead was the cause of
that Disorder. But on my mentioning this Difficulty to a Physician of that
Hospital, he inform'd me that the Stonecutters are continually using molten Lead
to fix the Ends of Iron Balustrades in Stones; and that the Soldiers had been
employ'd by Painters, as Labourers, in Grinding of Colours.62
These and other observations convinced Franklin of the hazards of lead. In a letter to a
friend in 1786, Franklin described the sources of lead poisoning and questioned "how
long a useful Truth may be known and exist, before it is generally receiv'd and practic'd
on."63
Early in the nineteenth century, Congress responded to a series of spectacular
boiler explosions on steamships by regulating the construction and maintenance of
steamship boilers,64 but health and safety regulation otherwise was left entirely to the
states. In the late nineteenth century state and local governments began to assume greater
responsibility for protecting worker health and safety. Beginning with Massachusetts in
1877, twenty-three states enacted factory inspection laws.65 In 1907 Illinois created a
Commission on Occupational Diseases whose report helped win enactment in 1911 of an
Occupational Diseases Act. This legislation required employers to “adopt and provide
reasonable and appropriate devices, means or methods for the prevention of such
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industrial or occupational diseases as are incident to such work or process.”66 However,
the preventative provisions in the law were largely unenforced until the 1930s when they
were struck down by the Illinois Supreme Court as “an unwarranted and void delegation
of legislative power.”67
In 1906, Congress responded to public concern about the safety of the food supply
by enacting federal meat inspection legislation68 and the Pure Food and Drugs Act.69
This legislation was animated more by concern over the economic impact of public fears
than by concern for protecting public health. Rather than authorizing broad new
regulations to protect health, the Pure Food and Drugs Act primarily prohibited
fraudulent representations concerning food and drug products.70 Similar concerns
provided the rationale for enactment of the Federal Insecticide Act of 1910, which was
designed to protect growers from being misled by false claims concerning the nature and
efficacy of pesticide products.71
During the early twentieth century, two important developments occurred in the
understanding of lead toxicity. Scientists discovered that children were highly sensitive
to lead exposure72 and that environmental, in addition to occupational, sources of lead
could be significant. A link between use of lead-based paint and childhood lead
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poisoning had been established in Australia by Lockhart Gibson in 1899. Earlier, it had
been shown that the children of workers in the Staffordshire potteries were intoxicated by
the lead brought into the home by their parents, whose working conditions were
appallingly contaminated.73 These were important scientific developments for
understanding the nature and scope of the hazards posed by lead. But they had little
effect on regulatory policy toward lead until long after World War II.
B. Controversy over the Introduction of Tetraethyl Lead
By the early 1920s, lead poisoning was well recognized as a major public health
problem. A German publication in 1922 listed more than three thousand references to
lead poisoning in scientific literature.74 A medical monograph published in the U.S. in
1926 described lead poisoning as “a preventable disease” that “is not only the most
common poisoning in industry,” but also the product of “diverse non-industrial sources”
such as water supplies, drugs and cosmetics.75
Despite widespread awareness of the hazards of lead, the use of lead in American
industry increased dramatically in the early twentieth century. Ultimately, this resulted
in the release of unprecedented quantities of lead directly into the environment,
generating some of the first expressions of concern over the public health implications of
lead exposure outside the occupational context. Even before the development of gasoline
lead additives, the growth of the automobile industry and its use of lead acid batteries had
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increased industrial use of lead. The discovery of tetraethyl lead ensured that every street
and highway in the nation would be dusted with substantial lead deposits.
To facilitate the manufacture of cars with larger engines, General Motors sought
to develop a new fuel additive that would enhance gasoline combustion and avoid engine
knock. After testing 33,000 chemical compounds during years of trial and error
experimentation, GM researcher Thomas Midgley, Jr., discovered in December 1921 that
tetraethyl lead had the properties it desired.76 General Motors joined with Standard Oil of
New Jersey to form the Ethyl Corporation to market the new lead additive. The product
initially was shipped directly to gas stations by DuPont, Ethyl's contractor, in small
bottles that could be added to each tank of gasoline.
On December 22, 1922, Hugh Cumming, the U.S. Surgeon General, sent a letter
to Pierre Du Pont that reflected an awareness of the severity of the lead poisoning
problem. It stated: “Since lead poisoning in human beings is of the cumulative type
resulting frequently from the daily intake of minute quantities, it seems pertinent to
inquire whether there might not be a decided health hazard associated with the extensive
use of lead tetraethyl in engines.”77 DuPont referred the letter to Midgley. Although
Midgley had become severely lead poisoned as a result of his research, he was convinced
that the effects of his own illness were reversible and that tetraethyl lead (TEL) posed no
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danger to the public because it would be sold in diluted form.78 He claimed that virtually
all the lead would remain in the car's engine. Midgley wrote the Surgeon General that
while people working in tunnels might absorb “a very small” amount of lead, “the
average congested street will probably be so free from lead that it will be impossible to
detect it.”79
TEL went on sale in Dayton, Ohio in February, 1923. To assuage public fears
about TEL, GM and Ethyl funded a study of its safety by the U.S. Bureau of Mines in
October 1923. In October 1924, before the study was completed, news reached the
public that four workers in a TEL manufacturing plant near Elizabeth, New Jersey had
died from lead poisoning after suffering violent delusions. Several dozen other workers
also had been hospitalized.80 Dubbed "loony gas" in the popular press, TEL subsequently
was found to be responsible for four other deaths of workers in a DuPont plant, two
deaths in a GM facility, and many other hospitalizations.81 With memories of chemical
warfare in World War I still fresh in many minds, a public outcry ensued and several
cities banned the sale of tetraethyl lead.82
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In March 1925, the Bureau of Mines released its study of the health effects of
TEL. The study was based on research exposing rabbits, dogs, sheep, ducks and rats to
exhaust from autos burning leaded gasoline for several hours a day over a period of
months. It found no health risks from exposure to the exhaust fumes. Public health
officials criticized the study because the Bureau of Mines had little expertise on health
issues and the study had been funded by GM and Standard Oil. At the urging of Harvard
public health professor Alice Hamilton and others, the Surgeon General convened a
conference in May 1925 to consider the health risks of TEL. Seventy representatives of
labor, industry, and the public health community participated in the conference, which
ultimately resolved that the Surgeon General appoint a group of experts to complete a
study of the health hazards of TEL by January 1, 1926. The manufacturers of such
additives agreed not to sell them until the panel convened by the Surgeon General
completed its studies.
In response to this resolution, the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) examined 252
men, some of whom worked at gas stations where leaded gasoline was sold and others
who did not. In January 1926, the PHS released its study, which detected no difference
in the health of the different groups of subjects. It found that TEL posed no health risks
to the general public, but rather that it was dangerous only when used in concentrated
form during manufacturing and processing.83 The study concluded that workers in
tetraethyl lead plants could be adequately protected by installing devices to prevent
worker exposure to fumes. Dangers to gas station attendants were deemed slight and
dangers to the general public were thought to be virtually nonexistent unless they used
83
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gasoline to clean textiles. To control the latter risk, it was agreed that lead gasoline
should be dyed and clearly labeled as such.
The study provided little basis for evaluating the long-term health effects of
emissions from leaded gasoline and it was criticized by Alice Hamilton and other
members of the public health community who wanted a safe substitute for TEL to be
developed. However, the conference procedure that had been used by the Surgeon
General was widely applauded and it was employed again in December 1928 to consider
the problem of radium poisoning in workers painting luminous dials on watch faces and
other instruments.84 The Radium Conference produced results similar to the Tetraethyl
Lead Conference – it was agreed that the problem would be studied further – but it
provided a vehicle for publicizing the concerns of workers.85
Alice Hamilton, who had conducted the pioneering Illinois investigation of
occupational diseases, ultimately expressed satisfaction with the use of the conference
procedure. In 1929 she stated that she doubted “if any method of dealing with a new
poison in industry would work more promptly and efficiently than does this entirely
informal and extra-legal method that we Americans have devised, given a new and
striking danger which lends itself to newspaper publicity.”86 However, she noted that “it
cannot be used to combat old and familiar dangers, lead, silica dust, mercury, benzol.
Nor can it be used for the newer poisons which do not produce spectacular effects; and
these are much more numerous.”87 Hamilton thought the Tetraethyl Lead Conference had
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at least helped protect workers in tetraethyl lead manufacturing plants from suffering
from very severe lead poisoning. In her autobiography published in 1943 she noted that
“close watch is still kept to detect possible cases, but the precautions worked out . . .
seem thus far to be so adequate that we do not fear any serious injury to the people
employed” in occupations using tetraethyl lead.88
The Surgeon General actually had recognized that the Public Health Service study
was inadequate for assessing the long-term effect of lead additives on human health. His
report, issued in 1926, warned that:
"It remains possible that, if the use of leaded gasolines becomes widespread,
conditions may arise very different from those studied by us which would render
its use more of a hazard than would appear to be the case from this investigation.
Longer experience may show that even such slight storage of lead as was
observed in these studies may lead eventually in susceptible individuals to
recognizable lead poisoning or to chronic degenerative diseases of a less obvious
character. In view of such possibilities the committee feels that the investigation
begun under their direction must not be allowed to lapse.... With the experience
obtained and the exact methods now available, it should be possible to follow
closely the outcome of a more extended use of this fuel and to determine whether
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or not it may constitute a menace to the health of the general public after
prolonged use or under conditions not now foreseen.... The vast increase in the
number of automobiles throughout the country makes the study of all such
questions a matter of real importance from the standpoint of public health."89
However, in the decades to follow, the lead industry continued to control virtually
all research and the close monitoring recommended by the Surgeon General was not
undertaken. It was not until the 1970s that regulatory attention focused on the chronic
effects of exposure to lead on children's health. The U.S. refused to sign the 1921
International Labor Organization agreement restricting the use of lead-based paint and,
having acquiesced to the introduction of lead alkyls in gasoline, both government and
industry appeared in alignment to promote expanded uses of lead.
The lead industry worked hard to convey the impression that extensive scientific
investigation had resolved all concerns about the health effects of lead emissions from
gasoline combustion. Promoting the notion that most human lead exposure was part of a
natural process, Dr. Robert Kehoe, medical director for the Ethyl Corporation, argued
that the human body excreted as much lead as it absorbed.90 Thus, according to the
industry, there was little cause for concern about the rapidly increasing use of lead in
industrial products. However, there was evidence that levels of lead in street dust had
increased by 50 percent in the first decade after the introduction of tetraethyl lead in

89

Rosner and Markowitz, supra at .
See Robert A. Kehoe, Frederick Thamann & Jacob Cholak, On the Normal Absorption
and Excretion of Lead, 15 J. Ind. Hygiene 257 (1933).
90

33

gasoline.91 Reports of widespread lead poisoning in children continued to mount during
the 1950s. Julian Chisholm reported that Baltimore children were excreting six times
more lead than workers exposed to lead in occupational settings.92 Physicians in
Philadelphia reported that 41 children had died from lead poisoning between 1956 and
1960 and that the annual death toll was increasing.93
In 1959 the lead industry announced that it wanted to increase by one-third the
concentration of lead additives in gasoline in order to accommodate cars with larger
engines. Without making any effort to evaluate the extent to which prior use of
tetraethyl lead had contributed to air emissions of lead, an advisory committee formed by
the U.S. Public Health Service decided that this would not pose a hazard to public health.
Efforts to monitor levels of lead in ambient air were launched in the early 1960s. In
1961, the U.S. Public Health Service commenced a study that sampled levels of lead in
the air of Cincinnati, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia. This “three-city study” provided
data that permitted researchers to begin to link airborne lead with lead levels in human
blood.94 The Public Health Service later conducted a “seven-city study”95 in cooperation
with representatives of the lead industry. As with previous studies involving the lead
industry, the Public Health Service continued to permit the lead-industry representatives
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to control the dissemination of information about the studies' results.96 Based on these
studies, the Public Health Service declared in 1965 that existing levels of lead in the
ambient air did not pose a significant threat to public health.
In Senate hearings held in 1966, Robert Kehoe stated that “no other hygienic
problem in the field of air pollution has been investigated so intensively, over such a
prolonged period of time, and with such definitive results.”97 As a result of these studies,
Kehoe declared, “this specific set of problems has been brought to such a point of
understanding, in relation to the public health, as to remove it from the realm of urgency
and to consign it into that group of hygienic problems on which a watchful and effective
surveillance should be kept.”98
Ironically, it was the elemental nature of lead, the very feature that makes it so
hazardous, that the industry cited to promote the notion that some human exposure is
inevitable.99 In a finger-pointing theme that was frequently repeated in subsequent
regulatory proceedings, Kehoe argued that humans were exposed to more lead in food
and drink than from air emissions.100 Kehoe maintained that this should not be of concern
because studies “have demonstrated clearly that the quantity of lead which is being
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absorbed daily by the average adult citizen of the United States who is not subjected to
occupational or otherwise unusual types of exposure to lead, is balanced for all practical
purposes by the excretion of a corresponding quantity of lead.”101
Yet even Kehoe conceded that “Lead poisoning in industry is still one of the most
frequent occupational diseases . . . despite the fact that we know how to prevent it.”102
However, Felix Wormser, former president of the Lead Industries Association (LIA),
maintained at the same hearings that “occupational hazards can now be controlled and
avoided” since all states had accepted a voluntary industry consensus standard for
exposures to lead. Wormser blamed “misdiagnosis” for “unduly increased public
concern about lead.” He claimed that he had seen “case after case of press reports
alleging lead as the cause of damage where lead was not even used or involved.”103 He
praised the manufacturers of children's furniture and toys for eliminating the use of leadbased paints and he noted that the American Standards Association had worked with LIA
to specify “a limit on lead content for interior paints.”104 Wormser concluded that “more
is known about the biological effects of lead than about almost any other air-borne
substance.” He assured the committee that “[o]n the basis of this scientific knowledge, I
can positively assert that lead constitutes no public health hazard in America today.”105
Kehoe also sought to create the impression that further surveillance would be
conducted to ensure that any public health problems would be detected before they
became serious. When pressed as to whether or not it would be desirable to replace
101
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gasoline lead additives if a substitute could be developed that did not have toxic effects,
Dr. Kehoe maintained that it would first be necessary to investigate the substitutes
extensively because he believed "as a matter of principle, that we must investigate every
material that we introduce into our environment because there are unknown effects."106
Kehoe's claims were challenged by Clair Patterson, a scientist with the California
Institute of Technology. At the same Senate hearings in 1966, he criticized public health
officials and the academic community for defending and promoting “ideas that may be
dangerous to the health of all Americans.” Based on his own calculations concerning
lead levels near California freeways, and human absorption of airborne lead, Patterson
declared that existing
levels of lead in the ambient air did pose a threat to public health.107 Noting that residents
of urban areas had significantly higher levels of lead in their blood than residents of rural
areas, Patterson declared that this could only be explained by the significant increase in
lead emissions from gasoline combustion.108
In response to these concerns, Congress in 1967 took a little noticed, but
significant, step when it adopted air quality legislation requiring that fuel additives be
registered.109 This legislation amended the 1965 Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control
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Act,110 which had initiated the process of establishing federal emissions standards for
new motor vehicles. Ironically, the first regulatory action that reduced levels of lead in
ambient air was a mandate to slash levels of photochemical oxidants and hydrocarbon
emissions from mobile sources. As the deadline for complying with this mandate
approached, the only available technology to achieve it was the catalytic converter, a
platinum-based device that increased the overall efficiency of combustion of gasoline
fuels. Fortunately for the health of children, the platinum-based converter was
“poisoned” by lead. In 1970, President Nixon asked Congress to promote the
development of lead-free gasoline by imposing a federal tax on lead additives.111
C. The Asbestos Tragedy
Like the history of human exposure to lead, the history of asbestos exposure is
replete with instances of early warnings of potentially catastrophic harm that failed to
generate effective, preventive regulation. Elevated levels of mortality among asbestos
workers were reported in 1906, a few years after a London doctor, H. Montague Murray,
had reported the first case of asbestosis, a deadly respiratory disease ultimately linked to
asbestos exposure. In 1924 the first case of a death clearly attributed to asbestosis
appeared in the medical literature. In the late 1920s, studies of elevated mortality rates
among asbestos workers were published. These studies inspired the British Parliament in
1931 to enact legislation requiring improved ventilation and dust suppression in the
asbestos-textile industry.112
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The U.S. asbestos industry succeeded in suppressing evidence of elevated
mortality among its workers during the 1930s, even as its insurers quietly moved to
restrict coverage of workers exposed to asbestos. Workers in other industries whose
lungs were scarred through inhalation of silica filed tort suits in massive numbers during
this decade.113 The use of new, mechanical drilling and milling technologies early in the
twentieth century had dramatically increased worker exposure to silica dust. Lawsuits
seeking more than a billion dollars in compensation for silicosis were pending in 1934.114
While many attributed the escalation of silicosis claims to the onset of the Great
Depression, they created a crisis for the insurance industry which responded by lobbying
successfully for states to expand workers compensation to cover occupational diseases
such as silicosis and asbestosis, preempting tort litigation against employers.
During World War II, four and one-half million Americans working in shipyards
were exposed to dangerous levels of asbestos, which was widely used as a form of
insulation.115 Two decades later, in October 1964, Dr. Irving Selikoff’s epidemiological
studies of asbestos insulation workers established that these workers were experiencing
alarming rates of asbestosis and were dying of lung cancer at seven times the expected
rate.116 The evidence associating friable asbestos insulation with alarming rates of
asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer was so compelling that EPA banned the use of
such products shortly after it was given the authority to do so in the 1970s. By the year
2000, an avalanche of tort litigation had been filed against manufacturers of asbestos
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products, including more than 600,000 lawsuits against more than 6,000 defendants,
resulting in $54 billion in damages and litigation costs.117 More importantly, it is
estimated that between 1979 and 2001 more than 230,000 deaths in the United States
have been caused by exposure to asbestos.118 EPA’s difficulties in developing a coherent
strategy for controlling the risks posed by huge quantities of asbestos in schools and
buildings eventually convinced the agency to attempt to phase out remaining uses of
asbestos, as discussed in Part I below.
D. Precautionary Regulation by the Courts: The Reserve Mining Decision
While the hazards of lead and asbestos had become well known by the late 1960s,
uncertainty over the health effects of a newly-discovered hazard forced U.S. courts to
address the question whether a precautionary approach should be employed. The case,
which arose in Minnesota, involved an effort to force the Reserve Mining Company
(Reserve) to stop discharging 67,000 tons of taconite tailings daily into Lake Superior.119
Following a two-year interstate enforcement conference that heard hundreds of witnesses
and compiled thousands of exhibits, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) brought suit
against Reserve in February 1972. The suit, which was joined by the states of Michigan,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin as well as several environmental groups, was brought under
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federal and state common law and for violations of the Refuse Act,120 the Clean Water
Act (CWA),121 and state air and water pollution regulations.
After an EPA chemist discovered that the taconite tailings released fibers
structurally similar to asbestos in a source of drinking water serving Duluth, a town with
a population of 200,000, the case focused on whether ingestion of the fibers posed cancer
risks similar to those associated with inhalation of asbestos. The scientific evidence was
inconclusive, despite court-sanctioned efforts to sample the tissues of recently diseased
residents of Duluth. Federal district judge Miles Lord ultimately determined that
although there was no conclusive evidence of a hazard, the taconite tailings present in
Duluth’s drinking water posed a significant health risk because they were structurally
similar to asbestos. He then conducted a separate trial to determine the best means for
halting the discharges. After becoming frustrated with the company’s intransigence on
the remedy issue, he issued an order requiring that the discharges cease immediately.122
Reserve appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which
issued, and later renewed, a stay of Judge Lord’s order to avoid a shutdown of the
plant.123 In an opinion authored by Judge Myron Bright, a three-judge panel
emphatically rejected the notion that precaution should take precedence in the face of
scientific uncertainty:
“. . . [A]lthough Reserve's discharges represent a possible medical danger, they
have not in this case been proven to amount to a health hazard. The discharges
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may or may not result in detrimental health effects, but, for the present, that is
simply unknown. . . .
We do not think that a bare risk of the unknown can amount to proof in this case.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove that a demonstrable health hazard exists. This
failure, we hasten to add, is not reflective of any weakness which it is within their
power to cure, but rather, given the current state of medical and scientific
knowledge, plaintiffs' case is based only on medical hypothesis and is simply
beyond proof. We believe that Judge Lord carried his analysis one step beyond
the evidence. Since testimony clearly established that an assessment of the risk
was made impossible by the absence of medical knowledge, Judge Lord
apparently took the position that all uncertainties should be resolved in favor of
health safety. Since the appropriate threshold level for safe toleration of fibers
was unknown, the district court tipped the balance in favor of attempting to
protect against the unknown and simply assumed that Reserve's discharge
presents a health hazard. . . . [T]he district court's determination to resolve all
doubts in favor of health safety represents a legislative policy judgment, not a
judicial one. . . .
Although we are sympathetic to the uncertainties facing the residents of the North
Shore, we are a court of law, governed by rules of proof, and unknowns may not
be substituted for proof of a demonstrable hazard to the public health.”124
By rejecting a precautionary approach to regulation, the panel’s decision alarmed
federal and state environmental officials. In response to it, a bill was introduced in
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Congress to shift the burden of proof to polluters to prove the safety of their discharges
once it was shown that they present “a reasonable risk of being a threat to public health.”
Russell Peterson, then chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, supported this
proposed legislation, by arguing:
Because of the latent health effects of carcinogens it will be more than 10 years
before the magnitude of the health risk to the people of Duluth and Silver Bay
will be fully realized, and unfortunately it will be based upon the fate of over
200,000 people. Even a few more days of additional exposure pose an
unnecessary and unacceptable risk to the residents of the area.125
While this proposed legislation was not enacted by Congress, Reserve ultimately
was forced to end its discharges into Lake Superior. Although the Eighth Circuit panel
refused to endorse the district court’s precautionary approach to respond to a potential
health hazard, it concluded that the company was likely to lose on the claims that its
discharges violated the terms of its permit. Thus, the court conditioned is stay “upon
assurances that there will be a speedy termination of Reserve's discharges into Lake
Superior and control of its emissions into the air.”126 After negotiations with Reserve
failed to produce agreement on a plan to abate the discharges, the Eighth Circuit
announced a briefing schedule for hearing Reserve’s appeal en banc. The court’s en banc
decision upheld Judge Lord’s issuance of an injunction to require abatement of the
discharges into Lake Superior, but rather than requiring that they be halted immediately,
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it gave Reserve “reasonable time” to abate them “on reasonable terms.”127 The court
stated that “[t]he United States and the other plaintiffs have established that Reserve's
discharges into the air and water give rise to a potential threat to the public health. The
risk to public health is of sufficient gravity to be legally cognizable and calls for an
abatement order on reasonable terms.” However, it noted that “[n]o harm to the public
health has been shown to have occurred to this date and the danger to health is not
imminent.” But it justified its decision to require abatement of the hazard on the ground
that “[t]he evidence calls for preventive and precautionary steps.” Finding no reason to
require Reserve to shut down immediately, the court granted it “a reasonable opportunity
and a reasonable time period to convert its Minnesota taconite operations to on-land
disposal of taconite tailings and to restrict air emissions at its Silver Bay plant, or to close
its existing Minnesota taconite-pelletizing operations.” Because the court believed that
the “evidence suggests that the threat to public health from the air emissions is more
significant than that from the water discharge,” it directed Reserve to “take reasonable
immediate steps to reduce its air emissions.”
The Eighth Circuit’s en banc decision in Reserve serves as an important precedent
for the application of the precautionary principle in the United States. It represents an
explicit recognition by the court that in circumstances where science simply cannot
resolve the question whether something poses an environmental risk, it still may be
appropriate to require precautionary measures to be taken. Thus the court agreed that it
was reasonable to require abatement of the tailings discharges even in the face of
uncertainty concerning their actual impact on human health. Thus, the Eighth Circuit
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upheld the trial court’s order directing Reserve to phaseout disposal of taconite tailings in
Lake Superior.
After bitter battles between Reserve and Judge Lord continued on remand, the
Eighth Circuit ultimately removed Judge Lord from the case for exhibiting what it
deemed to be pro-plaintiff bias and substantial disregard for its mandate.128 In July 1976,
Judge Devitt found Reserve to have violated the law, fined the company heavily, imposed
sanctions for its misconduct during discovery, and gave it one year to halt all
discharges.129 These decisions later were upheld in full by the Eighth Circuit.130
E. Legislation Authorizing Precautionary Regulation and the Ethyl Decision
During the 1970s, Congress adopted far-reaching legislation establishing
comprehensive programs to protect the environment.131 These laws – the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act -- represent a sharp departure from the common law approach to
environmental protecting by endorsing precautionary measures to prevent environmental
damage before it occurs. The first major federal statute adopted during this period -- the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)132 – directs federal agencies before
undertaking any major actions to prepare and consider detailed assessments of their
environmental impacts and of alternatives to them. This environmental assessment
requirement has been widely emulated throughout the world and it has become a central
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element of the environmental protection infrastructure in many countries. By requiring
agencies to carefully examine the prospective consequences of their actions, NEPA
enhances the ability of decisionmakers to take precautionary action.
The first major federal regulatory statute Congress adopted was the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970.133 This legislation endorsed precautionary regulation by requiring
the newly-created Environmental Protection Agency to set national ambient air quality
standards to protect public health with a margin of safety built into the standards.134 This
legislation also directed EPA to set standards that would require at least a 90 percent
reduction in exhaust emissions from new motor vehicles. Congress also authorized the
EPA to control or to prohibit the use of any fuel additive whose emission products "will
endanger the public health or welfare . . ."135 To meet the required 90 percent reduction
in conventional pollutants, new automobiles had to be equipped with catalytic converters.
Because lead additives in gasoline render catalytic converters ineffective in controlling
exhaust emissions, the use of leaded gasoline in the new vehicle fleet had to be
prohibited.
In January 1971, the EPA announced that it was considering controls on lead
additives in gasoline not only because of lead's incompatibility with catalytic converters,
but also because of concern over the effects of lead emissions on public health.136 In
February 1972, the EPA proposed regulations to ban the use of leaded gasoline in cars
with catalytic converters and to require a phased reduction in the lead content of leaded
133
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gasoline to 1.25 grams per gallon (gpg) by 1977.137 The EPA based its proposed limits
on the lead content of gasoline on a health assessment document that concluded that
airborne lead levels exceeding 2 ug/m3 were associated with a sufficient risk of adverse
physiological effects to endanger public health.138 However, in January 1973, when the
EPA adopted regulations requiring the use of lead-free gasoline in cars with catalytic
converters, it deferred adoption of limits on the lead content of gasoline because of
uncertainties concerning its assessment of the evidence of the heath effects of airborne
lead.139
The EPA Administrator determined that it was difficult, if not impossible, to
identify the precise level of airborne lead that would "endanger" health. However, he
reproposed the 1.25 gpg limit based on a new health assessment document that
considered the cumulative effect of airborne lead exposure on total human exposure to
lead. The Administrator emphasized that there was evidence that human exposure to
airborne lead occurred not only through direct absorption of lead in the lungs, but also as
a result of atmospheric deposition on soil, another source of significant exposure to
children. The EPA's new proposal required phased reductions in the lead content of
gasoline beginning in 1975 and culminating in 1978 with the 1.25 gpg limit.140
In response to a lawsuit by environmentalists, the EPA was ordered in October
1973 to decide within 30 days whether or not lead additives in gasoline should be
regulated for health reasons.141 In November 1973, the EPA issued a revised health
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assessment document that determined that lead emissions from gasoline presented "a
significant risk of harm" because they significantly increase total human exposure to
lead.142 In December 1973, it adopted the proposed limit on the lead content of gasoline
after modifying it to base the standard on grams of lead per gallon of all gasoline
produced.143 This modification was designed in part to encourage greater production of
unleaded gasoline because it would permit a refinery to increase the lead content of the
leaded gasoline it produced as it expanded production of unleaded gasoline. The standard
required large refineries to begin phased reductions in lead usage on January 1, 1975,
with small refineries to follow on January 1, 1977. By January 1, 1979, all refineries
were required to comply with a standard of 0.5 gpg for all gasoline produced, which was
equivalent to the 1.5 grams per leaded gallon standard.
Lead-additive manufacturers challenged EPA's decision in court. In December
1974, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit struck down the regulations by a 2-1 vote, with Judge J. Skelly Wright dissenting.
In a majority opinion by Judge Wilkey, the court held that there was insufficient evidence
to prove that lead emissions "will endanger the public health or welfare," as required by
the Clean Air Act. The court stated that "the case against auto lead emissions is a
speculative and inconclusive one at best."
The EPA appealed this decision to the full court, which agreed to rehear the case.
In March 1976, the court by a 5-4 vote reversed the three-judge panel's decision and
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upheld the lead standard.144 In a decision that stands as a landmark in its endorsement of
precautionary regulation, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to regulate
lead additives even though it could not be proven with certainty that they endanger public
health. In his majority opinion, Judge Wright noted the precautionary nature of the
Clean Air Act’s regulatory mandate. “Regulatory action may be taken before the
threatened harm occurs; indeed the very existence of . . . precautionary legislation would
seem to demand that regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the perceived
threat.”145
The tetraethyl lead manufacturers argued that there was no definitive proof that
emissions of lead from gasoline caused harm. They maintained that EPA was required to
present some “dispositive study” to demonstrate that lead additives in gasoline had
caused lead poisoning in individuals. The court acknowledged the lack of “hard proof of
any danger,” but it rejected the notion that such proof was necessary before precautionary
regulation could be implemented. “Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal – to the
extent that even science can be certain of its truth. But certainty in the complexities of
environmental medicine may be achievable only after the fact . . . Awaiting certainty will
often allow for only reactive, not preventive regulation.”146
After reviewing the 10,000-page record, the court focused on three EPA
conclusions that the lead additive manufacturers had challenged: (1) that based on a
preliminary determination that blood lead-levels of 40 µg/dl are indicative of a danger to
health, elevated blood levels exist to a small but significant extent in the general adult
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population and to a very great extent among children; (2) that airborne lead is directly
absorbed into the body through respiration to a degree that constitutes a significant risk to
public health; and (3) that airborne lead falls to the ground where it mixes with dust and
poses a significant risk to the health of urban children. The court observed that while no
specific blood-lead level could be identified as the threshold for danger, the 40-µg/dl
level was a conservative standard, and that studies of the blood-lead levels of workers in
various occupational groups who work outside and whose only exposure to lead is
through the ambient air justified EPA's first conclusion. The court found that theoretical,
epidemiological, and clinical studies supported the second conclusion, and it upheld the
third conclusion as a hypothesis that is consistent with known information about highlead concentrations in dust in urban areas and the behavior of children.
The court rejected the industry's claim that a "dispositive study" had to support
EPA's determination, noting that "[b]y its nature, scientific evidence is cumulative." The
court noted the difficulties inherent in determining whether or not lead emissions
endanger health, including the existence of multiple sources of human exposure to lead
and the difficulties of conducting controlled experiments on humans. However, it
upheld EPA’s regulation by emphasizing the precautionary purpose of the statute:
"Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by,
uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the
regulations designed to protect public health, and the decision that of an expert
administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect.
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Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute
is to be served."147
The Ethyl decision remains a landmark in environmental law because of its
endorsement of the precautionary principle long before it became a staple of global
environmental policy. The decision established that precautionary regulation could be
based "on the inconclusive but suggestive results of numerous studies" suggesting that
exposure to a substance was likely to endanger health even in the absence of conclusive
proof that such adverse health effects actually had occurred.148 It also indicated that
courts would be deferential in reviewing the judgment of the EPA Administrator in
assessing the significance of scientific evidence.
Shortly after the Ethyl decision, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to change
the standard for regulating fuel additives from "will endanger public health or welfare" to
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare." This
essentially codified the Ethyl court's approach and confirmed EPA's authority to regulate
fuel additives on the basis of information that they are likely to produce harm, without
first requiring that they be shown to have produced such harm.
In his dissent, Judge Wilkey argued that: "If there can be found potential harm
from lead emissions, the best (and only convincing) proof of such potential harm is what
has occurred in the past (either in 50 years of practical usage or in laboratory experimentation), from which the Administrator can logically deduce that the same factors will
produce the same harm in the future."149 Under his view, the fact that lead has been
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emitted from automobiles for so many years would require some showing that harm has
actually been caused by them, even if a more relaxed standard might be applicable when
considering regulation of new substances.
Even though the "Seven Cities Study" had found that only a very small
percentage (0.15%) of adults had elevated blood levels, EPA argued that the study was
methodologically flawed, and had relied on evidence of elevated lead levels in
occupational groups (e.g., mailmen, service station employees) whose only exposure to
lead would be through air emissions. While Judge Wilkey asserted that EPA was simply
"picking and choosing" data to support its conclusion, the majority supported EPA's
approach. As discussed in Section H below, subsequent events have decisively
confirmed the wisdom of EPA's precautionary approach.
F. Action to Phase Out CFCs and Other Ozone-Depleting Substances
Although it was well known that exposure to lead could harm humans, the true
uncertainty in Ethyl concerned the degree of human exposure to lead caused by
combustion of lead additives in gasoline. The most dramatic instance in which U.S.
regulatory policy has responded to purely theoretical risks is its response to the theory
that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could damage the earth’s ozone layer. In 1974 two
scientists from the University of California -- Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina -published a paper suggesting that the ozone layer could be damaged by a family of
chemicals once hailed as a miracle of modern science. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),
chemicals used in a wide variety of industrial applications including aerosol propellants,
foam blowing, air conditioning, and solvents, were discovered in the 1920s by Thomas
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Midgely, the same chemist who invested tetraethyl lead. At the time of his discovery,
CFCs were considered to be a marvelous advance for public health and safety because
they could be used to replace highly toxic materials that formerly had been used to
insulate refrigeration equipment. Beginning in the 1950s, CFCs had become widely
used, particularly as propellants in popular aerosol spray deodorants. Rowland and
Molina hypothesized that CFCs would reach the upper atmosphere, where they could be
broken apart by the intense energy of the sun, releasing chlorine. The chlorine would then
act as a catalyst, converting ozone (O3) to oxygen, destroying the Earth's protective ozone
shield.
Rowland and Molina's study sparked considerable research that confirmed that
their hypothesis was theoretically sound, though at the time it was not possible then to
prove definitively that CFCs actually were destroying the ozone layer. As publicity
focused on potential harm to the ozone layer, American consumers stopped buying
aerosol sprays (including those without CFCs); in less than two years the market for
products with such sprays dropped by two-thirds without any government regulation.
Competing manufacturers began advertising that their products did not contain chemicals
thought to harm the ozone layer. While disputing the notion that CFCs threatened the
ozone layer, industry eventually agreed, after several states initiated regulatory
proceedings, that federal regulation would be preferable to potentially conflicting state
standards. In March 1978 regulations were jointly issued by EPA (under TSCA), the
FDA, and the CPSC to limit the use of CFCs in "nonessential" aerosol propellants
(military and medical uses were exempted).
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Even before international research could pinpoint the role of CFCs in ozone
depletion, discovery of an ozone "hole" demonstrated the vulnerability of the ozone layer.
This contributed to a heightened sense of urgency that spurred international negotiations
based on the framework established by the Vienna Convention. Four negotiating
sessions, beginning in Geneva in December 1986, culminated in the signing of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in September 1987. The
Protocol called for a freeze on production and consumption of CFCs and halons at 1986
levels, followed by a 50 percent reduction in CFC use by industrialized countries over a
ten-year period.150
G. The Supreme Court’s Benzene Decision
Congress often has mandated that technology-based standards be promulgated to
reduce environmental and occupational risks. The Clean Air Act requires EPA to
establish technology-based standards that must be met by new or modified major
stationary sources and by companies that emit hazardous air pollutants. The Clean Water
Act requires EPA to set technology-based effluent limits on discharges of water
pollutants on an industry-wide basis. The Occupational Health and Safety Act requires
OSHA to promulgate an occupational health standards that “most adequately assures, to
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,” that “no worker suffers
material impairment of health of functional capacity” even if exposed to the hazard
throughout his working life.151 Because technology-based standards are not based on

150

R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 31 (1991)
(hereinafter Ozone Diplomacy); L. Dotto and H. Schiff, The Ozone War 195-197 (1978).
151
29 U.S.C. §655(b)(5).

54

assessment of the extent of likely harm caused by regulated pollutants, they often are
viewed as an example of precautionary regulation.152
Fears that judicial endorsement of precautionary regulation in both Ethyl and
Reserve Mining could spawn overregulation were calmed somewhat when the U.S.
Supreme Court issued its “Benzene decision” in 1980. A plurality of the Court
concluded that a statutory command to establish a standard that “most adequately assures,
to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,” that “no worker suffers
material impairment of health of functional capacity” even if exposed to the hazard
throughout his working life,153 did not automatically require reducing exposure to
carcinogens to the lowest feasible level. Instead it held that the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) must first perform a risk assessment to establish that the
risk is “significant” and that it could be appreciably reduced by the standard it ultimately
promulgated.154 Thus, the Court conditioned precautionary regulation on the making of
threshold findings that such regulation would appreciably reduce risks that appear to be
substantial.
The Court’s plurality decision did not represent a wholesale rejection of the
precautionary approach to regulation. Rather it expressly endorsed the notion that
precautionary regulation could be undertaken in the face of uncertainty, while the Court
developed its own common law concerning what evidence was necessary to trigger
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regulatory action under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The plurality also
endorsed the use of conservative default assumptions in risk assessment (so long as “they
are supported by a body of reputable scientific thought”) and it specified that risk
assessment need not be quantitative in circumstances where such analysis was not
possible given the extent of uncertainty.155
By requiring OSHA to assess risks and to determine that they are “significant”
enough to warrant regulation, the Supreme Court placed a greater burden on agencies
seeking to adopt precautionary regulation. While this regulatory threshold in itself does
not appear to be a significant barier to regulation, the Court’s decision created yet another
obstacle for an agency already having great difficulty setting standards.156 It also meant
that workers had to tolerate exposure to dangerous levels of benzene for nearly a decade
longer than OSHA initially had intended when it promulgated an emergency temporary
standard in 1977, which was invalidated in court. It was not until 1987 that OSHA
ultimately lowered the permissible exposure limit for benzene to the very level it had
sought to adopt on an emergency basis a decade earlier.157
OSHA currently is considering a new permissible exposure limit for silica to
replace the national consensus standard it initially adopted, which is now woefully
outdated. Despite periodic assertions that the problem of worker exposure to silica has
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been solved, today between 200 and 300 workers die annually of silicosis. Thus, a
problem that commanded national attention seventy years when the Gauley Bridge
disaster was publicized, remains an example of regulatory policies that have been
insufficiently precautionary.158
H. The Phaseout of Tetraethyl Lead from Gasoline
Despite the Ethyl decision endorsing precautionary regulation, a serious attempt
to repeal lead phasedown came shortly after the Reagan Administration took office in
1981. President Reagan created a Task Force for Regulatory Relief, chaired by then Vice
President George H.W. Bush, which invited business executives to nominate regulations
that they thought should be repealed. The lead-phasedown program was near the top of
the industry “hit list.” The Task Force directed the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to relax or abolish the lead standard in order to save refiners the two cents per
gallon claimed to be the extra cost of producing unleaded gasoline.
In response to this directive, EPA in February 1982 proposed to relax or rescind
the lead standard for large refiners and to suspend indefinitely the October 1, 1982 date
for small refiners to comply with the 0.5 gpg standard.159 EPA based this proposal
entirely on a desire to reduce the costs incurred by petroleum refineries. In developing
the proposal EPA gave no consideration to the health effects of increased lead usage
other than to state that eventually the use of leaded gasoline would cease after cars
without catalytic converters disappeared from the highways. Although President Reagan
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had decreed that all significant, new regulatory proposals had to be subjected to rigorous
cost-benefit analysis,160 his administration did not interpret this decree to apply to
proposals to relax regulations because it was assumed that they would save industry
money. Thus no attempt was made to determine if relaxation of the lead standard would
result in net benefits to society.161
The Reagan Administration's effort to relax the lead standard ultimately was
unsuccessful in part due to data that became available while EPA’s rulemaking was
underway. The scientific equivalent of a "smoking gun" linking leaded gasoline with
lead poisoning was contained in the results of the second National Health and Nutrition
Examination Study (NHANES II). This study was conducted between 1976 and 1980, a
period during which a substantial reduction occurred in the use of leaded gasoline as the
result of turnover of the vehicle fleet to new cars using unleaded gasoline. The study
showed that as gasoline lead use declined between 1976 and 1980, mean blood levels
declined in closely parallel fashion from 16 to 10 µg/dl.162
Over the period from 1976 to 1980, use of lead additives in gasoline declined
approximately 40 percent, from 105,000 to 50,000 tons per year. Over these same four
years, median blood lead levels in the U.S. population aged 6 months to 70 years also
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declined by about 35 percent.163 This decrease was observed in all ages sampled. Thus it
could not be related to sources such as paint, which present particular problems of
exposure to young children. Of greater epidemiological significance, there was a similar
decrease in the prevalence of children with blood-lead levels in excess of 30 µg/dl
(formerly the definition of clinical lead to toxicity).
The NHANES study represented the most significant demonstration of the link
between lead additives in gasoline and human lead exposure. Because the study covered
thousands of persons and gathered meticulous demographic information on them, it was
possible to examine other variables to assess their contribution to the downward trend in
levels of lead in human blood. The NHANES II data showed the extraordinary strength
of the link between lead usage in gasoline and blood-lead levels, which persisted after
controlling for age, sex, race, geographic regions, income levels, and other factors. Other
studies demonstrated that even as leaded gasoline usage fluctuated seasonally, blood-lead
levels fluctuated in parallel fashion.
In the face of overwhelming evidence that relaxation of the lead standard would
dramatically increase the incidence of lead poisoning among children, the EPA
abandoned its efforts to abolish the lead standard.164 In November 1982 the agency
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adopted new regulations that actually strengthened the existing standard by modifying it
to restrict the total number of grams of lead that could be used per leaded gallon of
gasoline produced and by applying the same lead limits to all refiners, large and small.
In a subsequent court challenge to the new standard brought by small refiners, the
U.S. Court of Appeals was so impressed by the strength of the scientific evidence linking
leaded gasoline with levels of lead in children’s blood that it questioned why EPA had
not decided to ban lead additives entirely. The court concluded that "In sum, the
demonstrated connection between gasoline lead and blood lead, the demonstrated health
effects of blood lead levels of 30 µg/dl or above, and the significant risk of adverse health
effects from blood lead levels as low as 10-15 µg/dl would justify EPA in banning lead
from gasoline entirely."165
Although scientific evidence was mounting that lead emissions posed an even
greater danger to public health than previously believed, the EPA did not consider
strengthening the lead standard until it was confronted by an entirely separate problem.
Emissions of conventional pollutants (e.g., hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, carbon
monoxide) from motor vehicles were increasing because many new cars that were
supposed to use only unleaded gasoline had been misfueled with leaded gas because it
was slightly cheaper. The use of leaded gasoline in new vehicles equipped with catalytic
converters had rendered many of these emissions-control devices ineffective.
Environmentalists urged EPA to solve the misfueling problem by phasing out the use of
gasoline lead additives. Curiously, the decision to consider slashing the lead content of
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gasoline was initiated almost by accident. Prior to his death, former EPA Deputy
Administrator Al Alm wrote that this action, which he believed to be the most significant
EPA initiative during his five and one-half years at the agency, came about in the
following manner:
“[T]he overwhelming environmental agenda facing EPA did not include further
removal of lead from gasoline as a serious priority. Then by chance, in a meeting
in my office, someone asked me, ‘Why are you allowing any lead in gasoline?
There don't appear to be any benefits from it, and there are any number of health
risks.’ On the basis of this statement, I commissioned a group of people in EPA's
policy office to look into the problem. They came up with an absolutely superb
document concluding that the risks of continuing to use lead in gasoline were
high, and that the benefits of its continued use were negative. The argument for
eliminating lead in gasoline clearly emerged as compelling, and it would have
been irresponsible to pursue any other course.”166
EPA staff then prepared a study of the costs and benefits of strengthening the lead
standard as a means not only of protecting health, but also of reducing misfueling.
In March 1984, the EPA released the results of this cost-benefit analysis, which
showed that a 90% reduction in the lead content of gasoline would generate net benefits
of several billion dollars. While the cost of making gasoline would increase by less than
1%, EPA estimated that such a reduction in lead usage would reduce the number of
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children with blood-lead levels above 30 µg/dl by more than 50,000 in 1986 and would
substantially reduce emissions of conventional pollutants by reducing misfueling while
saving nearly a billion dollars annually in vehicle maintenance expenses.
In August 1984, the EPA proposed to reduce the lead content of leaded gasoline
by more than 90% (to 0.10 gpg), effective January 1, 1986. This proposal was adopted
by EPA in March 1985, along with an interim phasedown to 0.50 gpg, which became
effective on July 1, 1985. During the EPA rulemaking new studies linking elevated lead
levels in adult males with high blood pressure provided further evidence that the
deleterious health effects of lead emissions are not confined to young children.167
Although the EPA did not rely on the blood-pressure studies in making its decision to
strengthen the lead standard, they provided further impetus for banning lead from
gasoline entirely. In the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress banned the
sale of leaded gasoline after December 31, 1995.168
I. EPA’s Asbestos Phaseout Rule and the Corrosion Proof Fittings Decision
Enacted in 1976, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was designed to
provide EPA with an integrative approach to regulating substances whose uses, from
cradle to grave, posed significant risks to human health and the environment. After the
legislation was signed into law by President Ford in October 1976, then EPA
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Administrator Russell Train hailed it as "one of the most important pieces of 'preventive
medicine' legislation" ever passed by Congress.169 However, TSCA has largely failed to
achieve its promise of comprehensive, preventive regulation on a multi-media basis.
This is well illustrated by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings
v. EPA,170 which invalidated one of EPA’s most significant initiatives during the
administrations of President Reagan and George H.W. Bush – EPA’s effort to phase out
remaining uses of asbestos. EPA well understood the human health risks of asbestos,
which had led it to ban some of the most dangerous uses of asbestos, including friable
insulation products. After an extensive investigation that extended for more than a
decade and that included the promulgation of a rule requiring companies using asbestos
to report data to EPA, the agency proposed its phaseout rule. The agency did so based on
its conclusion that only a staged-ban “will adequately control” the life cycle of asbestos
exposure risks that occur whenever the substance is mined, used in manufacturing,
released into the environment through deteriorating asbestos-containing products, or is
disposed. This regulation was struck down by a panel of Fifth Circuit judges who
concluded that the agency had failed to perform sufficiently detailed cost-benefit analyses
of banning not only of each particular use of asbestos, but also of all intermediate
alternatives short of a ban.171
Three aspects of the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision are particularly relevant to
consideration of the precautionary principle: (1) the court’s discussion of unquantified
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benefits, (2) its conclusion that EPA failed to perform sufficient analysis of the risks of
substitutes for asbestos, and (3) its endorsement of EPA’s decision to ban future uses of
asbestos. Section 6 of TSCA requires EPA to balance costs and benefits in determining if
“there is a reasonable basis to conclude” that any chemical substance “presents or will
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”172 The legislative
history of TSCA indicates that Congress did not intend to require EPA to base its
judgment concerning the reasonableness of risk on the results of detailed cost-benefit
analyses. The House committee report on the legislation states that the balancing
required by Section 6 “does not require a formal benefit-cost analysis” because “such an
analysis would not be very useful” given the uncertainties associated with efforts to
quantify benefits and costs of chemical regulation.173 The Senate committee report
emphasized that “it is not feasible to reach a decision just on the basis of quantitative
comparisons” because “one is weighing noncommensurates” and that EPA must all give
“full consideration” to the “burdens of human suffering and premature death.”174
Despite this legislative history, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the statute not only to
require detailed, product-by-product cost-benefit analyses, but also to require detailed
analyses of the costs and benefits of every intermediate step short of a ban for controlling
asbestos risks. It also rejected EPA’s conclusion that its “unreasonable risk
determination” was justified because the benefits it could not quantify (given the lack of
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data on actual ambient air levels of asbestos attributable to particular asbestos products)
were an order of magnitude greater than the quantified benefits.175 Rather than
employing conservative default assumptions when data were lacking, EPA analysts
working on the asbestos phaseout rule instead assumed that where exposure data were
lacking there was no exposure to asbestos. This “led to easy agreements between EPA
and OMB regarding the costs and benefits of the rule, an avoided charges that the agency
might be overstating risk or understating costs,” but it ultimately resulted in a gross
underestimation of the true risks posed by asbestos.176 The reviewing court then rejected
the agency’s efforts to justify the phaseout rule on the basis of unquantified benefits.177
The court’s decision erects an impossibly high analytical burden that barred EPA from
phasing out nearly all remaining uses of a substance that the agency believed posed an
unreasonable risk to human health. In doing so, the court essentially applied a reverse
precautionary principle. Its decision essentially declares that for a substance known to
cause serious and irreversible damage to health, lack of certainty concerning the costs and
benefits of all regulatory alternatives shall be used as a reason for not regulating it.
Critics of the precautionary principle argue that it is potentially paralyzing
because any regulatory action may create risks of its own that could leave society worse
off than before. They frequently cite Corrosion Proof Fittings in support of this
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proposition because the court chastised EPA for failing to perform detailed analyses of
the risks of substitutes for asbestos.178 But the issue of the risks of substitutes arose
during the asbestos rulemaking only because producers of asbestos, who maintained that
their products did not pose significant risks, disingenuously argued that other products
that might appear as substitutes for them would. This was classic strategic behavior by
the purveyors of one of the most thoroughly studied toxic substances (the legislative
history of TSCA indicates that asbestos was one of substances Congress considered to be
a prime candidate for a phaseout) and it was designed simply to erect yet another
impossible analytic burden on an agency seeking to regulate a known risk. By requiring
EPA to conduct an analysis of the toxicity of substitutes whenever a regulatory target
“brings forth credible evidence” suggesting its toxicity, the Fifth Circuit again applied a
reverse precautionary principle that could prevent known, unreasonable risks from being
phased out if there is uncertainty concerning the risks of what may replace them.
Despite the decision’s obvious faults, lurking in one aspect of Corrosion Proof
Fittings is a surprisingly powerful endorsement of the precautionary principle. Almost
unnoticed in the wake of the court’s invalidation of the asbestos phaseout, is the court’s
surprising holding affirming EPA’s decision to ban all past asbestos products that no
longer were being produced in the U.S. as well as all unknown, future uses of asbestos.
The court noted that although products no longer being sold in the U.S. currently pose
zero risk, “[t]his would soon change if the product returned, which is precisely what the
EPA is trying to avoid.”179 For future products, the court conceded that “EPA cannot
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possibly evaluate the costs and benefits of banning unknown, uninvented products.”
However, it held “that the nebulousness of these future products, combined with TSCA’s
language authorizing the EPA to ban products that ‘will’ create a public risk, allows the
EPA to ban future uses of asbestos even in products not yet on the market.”180 For these
products, the court requires neither cost-benefit analysis, nor analysis of the risks of
possible substitutes. It recognizes that because the uncertainties surrounding future
products make it impossible to perform such analyses, EPA’s precautionary approach is
proper to avoid the appearance (or re-appearance) of potentially deadly products.
While the court’s decision effectively precludes EPA from banning existing uses
of asbestos, many other countries have done so and even the World Trade Organization
(WTO) has ruled in favor of such bans. As of January 2005, 38 countries, including most
EU members, have banned asbestos.181 In September 2000, a WTO dispute resolution
panel upheld France’s ban on imports of chrysotile asbestos, rejecting arguments by
Canada that it was an unjustified restriction on trade, an argument representatives of the
Canadian asbestos industry had made during the EPA rulemaking.182 The panel
concluded that the risks of asbestos had been so thoroughly researched that the ban,
which normally would violate WTO rules promoting free trade, was justified as
necessary to protect human health.
IV. CONCLUSION: REGULATORY POLICY & THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE
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The foregoing, rather extended, review of aspects of the history of U.S. regulatory
policy offers some useful lessons concerning how society has responded to
environmental risk and the value of a precautionary approach to regulation.
A. Lessons from the History of Lead Poisoning
The history of lead poisoning demonstrates that regulatory policy sometimes errs,
and errs badly, by underestimating or overlooking truly significant risks.183 While
availability of scientific knowledge has a critical impact on regulatory priority-setting,
public awareness of risk seems to be an even more important influence in focusing
regulatory attention on suspected problems. Despite widespread awareness of the risks of
exposure to lead, regulatory attention is far less likely to be devoted to chronic, low level
environmental hazards than it is to acute, highly visible incidents that command public
attention.184
The deaths of workers producing TEL in the 1920s only briefly focused the
attention of public-health and regulatory authorities on the potential long-term health
effects of lead in gasoline. Public alarm gave regulatory authorities an opportunity to
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consider whether to permit a new technology that ultimately would disperse massive
quantities of a known toxic substance into the environment, causing enormous damage to
public health. An appropriate precautionary step was taken when leaded gasoline
temporarily was removed from the market pending the results of further research.
Unfortunately, the study designed to assess the risks of leaded gasoline focused only on
short-term exposures. Children, who we now know are the most susceptible to damage
from lead emissions, were not included in the study, even though there already was some
knowledge about what groups were likely to be most susceptible to damage from lead
emissions.185
Perhaps the crucial shortcoming of regulatory policy was its failure to follow up
on the initial studies of the health effects of tetraethyl lead despite the recommendations
from the blue-ribbon panel that further, long-term research was needed. As a result, for
more than four decades virtually no research, independent of that performed by the lead
industry, focused on the health effects of lead emissions from gasoline. In part, this may
have been the product of an unwarranted perception that the question had been settled
once and for all, at least for purposes of regulatory decisionmaking. Such myopia
unfortunately is too frequently a feature of the regulatory process. A preliminary
decision that a substance does not warrant regulatory attention may have an important
influence on the future direction of scientific research.
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While it is now known that public health would be far better off if regulators had
never permitted the use of leaded gasoline, it was almost by coincidence that regulatory
attention eventually focused on the health effects of lead additives. The initial EPA
restrictions on the use of leaded gasoline were a response to the need to protect catalytic
converters, rather than humans, from the effects of lead.186 Similarly, the eventual
decision to drastically reduce lead levels in gasoline was set in motion by frustration with
the misfueling problem, as much as by concern over the health effects of lead emissions.
Yet once policymakers eventually focused on the appropriate questions, a compelling
case was made for regulatory action.
While the elimination of lead additives from gasoline has been a major success
story for environmental regulation, it is only one important element of the total problem
of human lead exposure, which also includes a massive residue of lead paint in the urban
housing stock and lead in plumbing and piping fixtures that carry drinking water. In
1980 a report by the National Academy of Sciences stressed the need for a coordinated
approach to control all sources of human exposure to lead. It noted that “six federal
agencies, acting under authority of at least eight separate laws, have developed
regulations or administer programs intended to protect the public health from lead
hazards.”187 Although the Toxic Substances Control Act was designed to provide EPA
with such comprehensive regulatory authority, the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision
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effectively crippled the agency’s ability to conduct multi-source, multi-media regulation
by imposing seemingly impossible analytical preconditions on regulation.
B. The Elusive Search for a Regulatory Decision Rule
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis as a regulatory decision rule are highly critical
of the precautionary principle. Yet when they are asked to respond to potentially
catastrophic risks that are so uncertain that one cannot with a straight face assign
numerical values to the costs and benefits of controlling them, they end up suggesting
something like a precautionary approach.188 This is essentially what the Corrosion Proof
Fittings court did in upholding EPA’s ban on future uses for asbestos and this is what
society generally does in opting to protect endangered species.
While a cost-benefit analysis ultimately helped greased the wheels for EPA’s
decision to virtually eliminate lead additives from gasoline,189 it ultimately was the
undoing of the agency’s initiative to phase out most remaining uses of asbestos. The
difference is not because the latter was a poor decision, but rather that it was more
vulnerable to challenge because the agency deliberately had not employed it usual
precautionary approach in estimating all the benefits it anticipated from the rule.190 That,
combined with a reviewing court’s imposition of impossibly detailed analytic
requirements not contemplated by Congress when it enacted TSCA, led to invalidation of
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the rule and paralysis in using TSCA as a vehicle for addressing multi-media risks in a
comprehensive fashion.
The Ethyl decision leaves little doubt that had EPA been required to base its initial
decision to limit the amount of lead additives in gasoline on the results of a cost-benefit
analysis, it would have been impossible to promulgate this crucial regulation.191 The
agency’s initial rule was upheld by a 5-4 vote of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, sitting en banc, in a decision expressly endorsing the precautionary principle.
Had this decision gone the other way, the lead limits would have been invalidated and the
initial reductions in levels of lead in children’s blood would not have occurred. Thus, a
precautionary approach was crucial to the initial development of a regulation that was
later broadened to produce one of the most dramatic success stories for environmental
regulation.
C. Fear Not the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle does not answer the question of how precautionary
regulatory policy should be, but it can serve as an important reminder that regulatory
policy should seek to prevent harm before it occurs and that it should reject the insistence
of regulatory targets that a never-ending quest for improved information should
indefinitely postpone sensible regulatory measures. Despite the popularity of the
precautionary principle, in practice U.S. regulatory policy generally has been reactive,
rather than precautionary. Yet it has the capability of responding in a precautionary
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manner when a serious threat of potential harm, such as destruction of the Earth’s
protective ozone layer, captures public imagination and stimulates regulatory action.
The German concept of vorsorge, from which the precautionary principle has
evolved, emphasizes the importance of early detection of dangers to health and the
environment through comprehensive research. The absence of pre-market testing
requirements for new chemicals in the U.S. and the lack of toxicity information for a
large percentage of chemicals currently on the market,192 may help explain the generally
reactive nature of U.S. regulatory policy. This is why the environmental and public
health communities have been pressing to require testing of high production volume
chemicals and to close serious data gaps in EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System.193
Critics of the precautionary principle have focused largely on a caricature of it
that does not reflect the realities of global efforts to refine procedures for detecting and
responding to environmental risks.194 They argue that regulation creates its own hazards
without making a persuasive case that control of known risks will lead to substitute
hazards that are systematically likely to be worse, and less amenable to control, than
those that have triggered precautionary regulation. A strong case can be made that the
consequences for society of false negatives (erroneously deeming a hazardous chemical
to pose no hazard) generally are far worse than the consequences of false positives

192

EPA, Analysis of Test Data Availability for HPV Chemicals, 22 CHem. Reg. Rep.
261 (1998).
193
See Rena I. Steinzor, Katherine Baer & Matt Shudtz, Overcoming “Environmental
Data Gaps”: Why What EPA Doesn’t Know about Toxic Chemicals Can Hurt, CPR
White Paper #510 (July 2005).
194
See Applegate, supra note 32, which traces the “taming” of the precautionary
principle as efforts have been made to integrate it into a risk assessment framework.

73

(erroneously deeming a safe chemical to be hazardous),195 as illustrated by the history of
regulation of lead and asbestos. Moreover, those who insist that the precautionary
principle is undermined by potential secondary and tertiary risks spawned by regulatory
action ignore the often substantial secondary and tertiary benefits of regulation.196
Regulatory targets invariably seek to deflect attention from the risks their
activities generate by pointing the finger elsewhere, as well-illustrated by the regulatory
history of both lead and asbestos.197 As former EPA Administrator Christie Todd
Whitman observed in her remarkably candid memoirs:
Numerous businesses and trade associations, often represented by powerful
Republicans, spend millions of dollars each year lobbying against virtually any
new environmental regulation, invariably claiming it will hamstring their ability
to stay in business, even though a great many American companies have figured
out that good environmental practices are also good business practices. Many
others, however, almost reflexively oppose any mandate to improve their
environmental performance, no matter how much it needs improving. I
sometimes wonder whether those companies spend more money trying to defeat
new regulations than they would by simply complying with them.198
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Fears that the precautionary approach inexorably will lead to massive
overregulation greatly underestimate the ability of regulatory targets to fend off
regulation.199 This is reflected in the fact that the vast majority of the regulatory
initiatives that havebecome the focus of critics of environmental regulation because they
were projected to be overly costly were never actually implemented, as Lisa Heinzerling
has demonstrated.200
Critics of the precautionary principle have picked on a strawman by arguing that
it will produce overregulation when it in fact does not specify how precautionary
regulatory policy should be. Each sovereign country must decide for itself how
precautionary regulatory policy should be and such decisions ideally should be the
product of democratic processes. Countries legitimately may opt to establish levels of
environmental protection that are higher than those required by existing international
standards. What the precautionary principle does is to sensibly remind us of the reasons
why environmental policy has shifted away from the common law’s approach that
required individualized proof of causal injury before environmental harm could be
redressed. While it undoubtedly is possible to be overly precautionary and to take actions
in the name of precaution that end up backfiring, the history of regulatory policy suggests
that adherence to the precautionary principle is more likely to contribute to avoiding a
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repetition of tragedies like those caused by tetraethyl lead and asbestos than it is to cause
them. Fear not the precautionary principle.
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